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POLITICAL AdND JUDICIAL THEORIES
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
E. L. PHILLIPS*
The American doctrine of constitutional law is a unique
contribution to the sciences of government and law. Its
distinguishing feature is the power of the courts to declare
null and void the enactments of the legislative department
or the orders of the executive branch of the government.
This is in direct contrast to the European practice, where
every department is left free to determine the constitutional
limitations of its own action, and to the English system based
on an unwritten constitution over which the legislative de-
partment exercises supreme control. The result in one case
is that the constitution is nothing more than a moral or
political check upon governmental action with which the
courts and lawyers are not concerned save as to throw
light upon problems of statutory construction, while in the
other case, the constitution being a legal restraint upon all
official action, it vitally affects the American judge and
practitioner as it is frequently the basis upon which actual
litigation must be decided.
When the colonies declared their independence and
finally established their government under the Articles of
Confederation, they made no provision whatsoever for any
executive power, because of their traditional dread of ex-
ecutive action. That was one of the conspicuous reasons
that led to the utter failure of the government and resulted
in the adoption of the Constitution. The members of the
constitutional convention were still sorely afraid of execu-
tive power, but from sad experience under the Articles of
Confederation, they realized that such power was necessary
to a strong and efficient government and consequently pro-
vided for it in the Federal Constitution. However they
sought to protect themselves against executive tyranny by
adopting a doctrine of government (poZitiaZ philosophy)
known as the separation of powers. By this doctrine each
* Member of Wyoming County Bar, West Virginia.
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department-the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
-was to be supreme in its own sphere of action and could
not encroach upon the prerogatives of the others. And
from the political interpretation by each department of its
own power has arisen the controversies the judicial inter-
pretation of which has given the American people a Consti-
tution, far more comprehensive and complete than it was
when it came fire-new from the hands of the Convention.
The American party system has accentuated the prob-
lems of constitutional construction and from the resulting
controversies the constitution has always emerged more
complete, the Supreme Court, with few exceptions, more
respected and the people more enlightened. The party aim
has been in every case to give public opinion the force of
law by incorporating the issues in their platform and later
into statutes. Even then the judicial power to interpret
political theory is a latent force until the theory, as enacted
into law, is invoked as a means of remedial justice. But
generally speaking every law that is a result of political
issue before the people, previous to or at the time of enact-
ment, becomes sooner or later, in some form a subject of
judicial review. Thus we have been furnished with deci-
sions upon the great and fundamental questions of political
theory of constitutional construction the most important of
which are: the nature of the Federal Union, the policy of
expansion, the theory of the National Bank, the theory of
Legal Tender, the protective Tariff, internal improvements,
a:nd the Income Tax. About these great questions political
debate has raged, and learned and profound judicial opin-
ions have been rendered by the greatest earthly judicial
tribunal.
Two theories of construing the Constitution immed-
iately arose upon its adoption, that of liberal construction
adopted by Hamilton and the Federalists and followed by
the Whigs and Republicans, and that of strict construction
held by Jefferson and the Anti-Federalists and followed by
Democratic-Republicans and the Democrats. But the first
great question to be settled-that of judicial power over
legislative enactment-had -its inception long before the
adoption of the Constitution. The earliest American deci-
sion that judges might disregard legislative acts forbidden
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by the Constitution appears to have been given in New
Jersey in 1780, in the case of Holmes v. Walton. The supreme
Court of New Jersey in that case declared a statute, provid-
ing for a jury of six men to try certain cases, to be unconsti-
tutional and void. In this case the legislature acquiesced.
A New York case, Rutgers v. Waddington, followed in 1784,
in which the court so construed an act of the New York leg-
islature as to avoid a violation of the treaty of peace with
Great Britain. The decision excited considerable popular
discontent and theNew York Assembly passed a resolution
denying the right of the court to dispense with an act of
the legislature. A little later the judges in Rhode Island
likewise declared void an act of the legislature in violation
of the Constitution in the case of Trevett v. Weeden. The
Rhode Island legislature summoned the judges before it
to explain their reasons for this, and their explanations not
being satisfactory the legislature passed a resolution to
dismiss the judges. Many other colonial courts made simi-
lar decisions with more or less success before the adoption
of the Federal Constitution. When the Philadelphia con-
vention met in 1787 to frame the constitution its legal mem-
bers, of whom there were a number of much prominence,
must have known of these decisions, and it is likely that the
convention expected the courts to exercise the power of
disregarding unconstitutional acts of Congress. John Fran-
cis Mercer of Maryland opposed this view and it was an
argument used by the Anti-Federalists against adopting the
Constitution. Hamilton thought the people needed to give
the courts such power to protect them from obscure and
equivocal laws, "for," said he, "all new laws tho penned
with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest
and most mature deliberation are more or less obscure and
equivocal until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."
The Federal Courts were not long in asserting the doctrine,
but it was not until 1803 in the case of Marbury v. Madison
that the question was finally settled. In that case Marbury
held a judicial appointment under Adams, which had been
duly approved by the Senate, his commission was duly
signed and sealed but not delivered when Adams was
succeeded by Madison who refused to deliver the commis-
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sion. Marbury applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the delivery of the commission. Chief
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court sus-
taining the contention of Marbury, but in so doing held that
that clause of the Judiciary Act that gave the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction in issuing writs of mandamus
was unconstitutional; hence, inoperative and void. Thus
the Supreme Court in establishing the supremacy of the
Constitutional limitations on the departments did so in a
most democratic way,-by rejecting an extension of its own
jurisdiction,-and settled for all time that the supreme sov-
ereignty resides in the people; that they have the power
to organize the government and to assign to the different
departments their respective powers; that the constitu-
tion defined the limits of legislative power, and beyond
these limits congress could not go, without the expressed
will of the people in the form of constitutional amendments.
It was to be definitely understood that under our written
constitution Congress did not possess, and could not exer-
cise, the omnipotence of Parliament.
The logic of Chief Justice Marshall in this historic opin-
ion is illustrated in the following extracts:
"The question whether an act repugnant to the Consti-
tution can become the law of the land, is a question
deeply interesting to the United States, but happily not
of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems
only necessary to recognize certain principles supposed
to have been long and well-established to decide it * '* *
The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited;
and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten,
the Constitution is written. * * * The Constitution is
either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by or-
dinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the Legisla-
ture shall please to alter it. If the former part of the
alternative be true, then written Constitutions are absurd
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in
its own nature illimitable. * * * If an act of the Legisla-
ture repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, not-
withstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige
them to give it effect? Or. in other words, though it be
not a law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it
were a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what
was established in theory, and would seem at first view
4
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an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, how-
ever, receive a more attentive consideration. It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases must of necessity expound and inter-
pret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each. So is a law
in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court
must either decide that case conformable to the law, dis-
regarding the Constitution, or conformable to the Consti-
tution, disregarding the law,-the Court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the
courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the
Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply."
Rufus Choate has said, with reference to this decision
and the importance of the doctrine enunciated:
"I do not know that I can point to one achievement in
American statesmanship which can take rank for its
consequences of good above that single decision of the
Supreme Court, which adjudged an act of the Legislature
contrary to the Constitution to be void, and that the
judicial department is clothed with the power to ascer-
tain the repugnancy, and pronounce the legal conclusion.
That the framers of the Constitution intended this to be
so is certain; but to have asserted it against Congress and
the Executive, to have vindicated it by that easy, yet
adamantine demonstration than wh4ch the reasoning of
mathematics shows nothing surer, to have inscribed this
vist truth of conservatism upon the public mind, so that
no demagogue, not in the last stage of intoxication,
denies it-this is an achievement of statesmanship (of
the judiciary) of which a thousand years may not ex-
haust or reveal all the good."
But one step remained and that was to declare a state
law void and of no effect because it violated a principle of
the Federal Constitution. An opportunity was soon given
in tle case of Fletcher v. Peck. In that case the state of
Georgia had sought, by legislative enactment to dispossess
a landholder of his property, which had been acquired
under a previous statute of the same state. The Supreme
Court held that a grant thus acquired was an executed
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contract and that the owner could not be dispossessed even
by subsequent legislation. Of this decision Carson says, in
his history of the Supreme Court:
"It towers above the decisions of a period of many
years, important and imposing though they are, and,
with Marbury v. Madison, stands as an outspur of that
magnificent range of adjudications which bear to our
constitutiondl jurisprudence the relative strength and
majesty of the Rocky Mountains to our physical geog-
raphy."
This doctrine was now complete and has never since been
seriously controverted. The principle was maintained by
the colonial court in colonial days, and early declared with ref-
erence to Federal statutes by the Supreme Court, and it was
but a logical and natural step to reaffirm the doctrine with
reference to the acts of the legislatures of the various
states.
The two theories of Constitutional construction were not
destined to be easily or permanently reconciled. Jefferson
supported his doctrine of strict construction with the ninth
and tenth amendments which are as follows: "The enun.-
eration in the Constitution of certain righis shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people," and "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively or to the people."
While Hamilton made his maxim, "If the end is clearly
defined, the means must be employed to reach it," justify
his belief in the implied powers and loose construction.
There can be little doubt that strict construction was a
sound principle in theory but the difficulty of amending
the Constitution led to the adoption of the principle of
liberal construction. In fact Jefferson found himself com-
pelled to violate his cherished doctrine in the purchase of
the Louisiana Territory which was beyond any possible
express power granted in the constitution. He recognized
his inconsistency and sought to have his act ratified by
constitutional amendment, but the general approval of the
people caused congress to ignore the request. Woodrow
Wilson characterizes Jefferson's recognition of his inconsist-
ency as a manifestation of mediocrity, yet one wonders what
6
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Marshall's reaction would have been, at the time, to the
Eight Hour LaW.
While the courts have often affirmed the doctrine of
loose construction, the justification has resulted from a
very limited number of provisions under Section VIII of the
Constitution, in which certain very definite powers have
been granted to Congress. The exercise of these powers
granted in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 18 of Section VIII has
most often called into question the limitation of Congres-
sional power, both in the courts and political debate. The
first paragraph gives to Congress power "to pay the debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States;" the second "to borrow money on the
credit of the United States;" and the third, "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes." This is true especially
of that phrase, "among the several states," in the third
paragraph, and the eighteenth, which is the general clause
giving to Congress power "to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore-
going powers, etc." The commerce clause (paragraph 3)
has been more often referred to by the courts than any other
clause of the constitution, and since the passage of the
Interstate Commerce act in 1884, and the recognition of the
constitutionality of the act by the courts it has become of
great importance. The first Federal decision involving the
commerce clause was that of Gibbons v. Ogden in which Ogden
sought to enjoin Gibbons from running a steamboat between
New York and New Jersey under a New York statute.
Chief Justice Marshall again asserted the doctrine of loose
construction, justifying it in this case upon authority of the
"elastic clause" (Sec. VIII, Cl. 18) holding that the power
to regulate commerce among the several states compre-
hended the regulation of navigation between the states.
Growing out of the financial plans of Hamilton, Con-
gress, in 1791, passed a law creating the first United States
Bank. The power to "emit bills of credit and make them
legal tender in payment of debts" was denied to the Federal
Government by the Constitution. So the friends of the
Bank sought justification in the power granted to Congress
"to borrow money upon the credit of the United States."
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But the Bank was destined to have a hectic career for it
was only chartered for twenty years and Clay, who was
later to become the Bank's greatest champion, opposed a
recharter on the ground that it was not originally authorized
by the Constitution and therefore a renewal would be un-
constitutional. Largely through his influence the charter
was defeated. Immediately thereafter a great number of
wild-cat banks sprang up. The country was flooded with
cheap paper money and national finances were in a chaotic
condition. Clay, returning from abroad, confessed his
views had changed and Madison also shifted from the oppo-
sition and when he became president sent a message to
Congress recommending a national bank. A bill was soon
introduced and passed and the Bank again opened its
doors for business. The constitutionality of the Bank Act
was soon to be upheld in the historic opinion of Marshall
in the case of McCullough v. The State of Maryland. This
decision was sustained in the case of Osborn v. The United
States Bank and the friends of the Bank were jubilant. But
its charter was again to lapse under the strong will of
Jackson and remain dormant until the exigencies of the
Civil War caused to be passed the National Banking Act.
This act never became the subject of attack on constitu-
tional grounds.
The Supreme Court met with its greatest difficulty in
applying the doctrine of loose construction to the second
clause of Section VIII, which gives Congress power to
"borrow money on the credit of the United States." This
clause was invoked to support the theory of Legal Tender.
Upon this question the Court decided three ways. The
first case involving the constitutionality of the Legal Tender
Acts was that of Hepburn v. Griswold in which the court
held the Acts unconstitutional. A little later, the court held
the Acts constitutional on the ground of public necessity and
expediency for self-preservation as a result of the Civil War.
The Court finally in the dase of Julliard v. Greenbaum came
straight out and held these acts constitutional on the broad
grounds of the power of Congress, not only to provide for
the common defense, but also as a result of the power "to
borrow money on the credit of the United States." This
decision was rendered in 1884, and, it has been said, carries
8
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the doctrine of loose construction further than any other
opinion ever announced by the Supreme Court.
Although the two major parties still adhere to their tra-
ditional views on interpretation, strictly speaking, however,
the party in power has been loose constructionists and their
opponents strict constructionists. Bryce justifies the doc-
trine in the following language:
"The interpretation which has thus stretched the Con-
stitution to cover powers once undreamt of may be
deemed a dangerous resource. But it must be remem-
bered that even the constitutions we call rigid must make
their choice between being bent or being broken. The
Americans have more than once bent their Constitution
in order that they might not be forced to break it."
Possibly Woodrow Wilson sounded the popular note of the
present time on this subject when he said: "Liberal con-
struction of the Federal charter the people want, but not a
false construction of it."
Party conviction has always been recognized as an essen-
tial qualification for the Supreme Bench, in addition to
legal learning and public service. And while the first
twelve years of the Court were tentative and incipient in
so far as results were concerned, only ardent supporters of
a strong federal system were elevated to the Bench, and the
unanimity of opinion in the early decisions had here its ex-
planation. In 1801 Adams appointed Marshall Chief Jus-
tice which at once facilitated the Federalist view of a
strong central government and launched the most remark-
able judicial career of modern times. In 1835, after thirty-
five years of continuous service as Chief Justice, Marshall
passed away at the advanced age of four-score years. His
death came during critical times, and furnished the oppor-
tunity for a decided change in the policy of the Court. He
left a Bench of able associates, the most learned being
Story, who in legal scholarship was the equal of Marshall.
The elevation of Story to the Chief Justiceship was, how-
ever, impossible, for Jackson was now serving his second
term as President, and he had often found himself in oppo-
sition to the rulings of the Court, and never hesitated to
ignore any of its decisions that represented views at vari-
ance with his own. His opportunity had now come to re-
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model the Court after his own fashion, and he did not hesi-
tate to make use of his opportunity. Three of the five asso-
ciates-McLean, Baldwin, and Wayne-held commissions
signed by Jackson, and the resignation of Duval in 1836
enabled him to appoint Barbour, df Virginia, who made
the fourth. But the real triumph of Jackson came with his
opportunity to name a Chief Justice. He appointed Roger
]3. Taney of Maryland, whose political views and public
conduct were in perfect harmony with those of the Presi-
dent, and the influence of these views and those of his asso-
ciates was soon to be manifested in judicial opinions. At
the time of the death of Marshall there were three cases
pending which involved the questions of the constitution-
ality of state laws. These had been argued before the
Court, and Justice Story asserted that Marshall had ex-
pressed the view that each law was unconstitutional. But
as no opinion had been handed down before the death of
Marshall, it became necessary to re-argue these cases, and
it was soon found that the view of the Court would now
be different.
The first case was that of the Mayor of the City of New
York v. Miln, which involved the constitutionality of an act
of the New York State Assembly, requiring the master of
every vessel arriving in the port of New York to report in
-writing his passenger list, and imposing a penalty for non-
compliance. Although it was argued that the statute was
obnoxious to the Constitution because in violation of that
provision of the Constitution that gave Congress the power
to regulate commerce, and although this view was supported
by the decisions of Gibbons v. Ogden and Brown v. The State
of Maf-yland, the state law was held by the majority of the
Court to be valid, the statute being a mere regulation of
police, and not an Attempt to regulate commerce. Justice
Barbour delivered the opinion of the court, and Justice
Story rendered a dissenting opinion.
A second departure from the doctrine of Marshall was in
the case of Bristoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, holding a state law empowering a bank to issue bills
to circulate as money to be valid in direct conflict with the
case of Craig v. State of Missouri. Justice Story again dis-
sented and referred to Marshall as having denied that state
10
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institutions had the power to issue bank-notes.
The third case was that of the Charles River Bridge v. The
Warren Bridge, a case that is notable from the fact that it is
the first expression of Chief Justice Taney on a constitu-
tional question, and the first case in which Daniel Webster
as counsel sustained defeat on a constitutional question
before the Supreme Court. The facts are these: A ferry
from Boston to Charlestown on the Charles River had been
authorized by the Legislature of Massachusetts, and the
tolls were to be paid to the Corporation of Harvard College.
In 1785, the Legislature authorized a bridge company to
construct a bridge across the river which took the place
of the ferry, and the company agreed to pay to Harvard
College an annual rental for a definite number of years,
after which the rental should cease and all profits should.
go to the bridge company. In 1828, the Legislature incor-
porated another company, known as the Warren Bridge
Company, with power to erect a second bridge across the
river. The older corporation sought an injunction to pre-
vent the erection of the bridge and the exercise of the
franchise. The state court upheld the validity of the law
granting the right of incorporation to the Warren Bridge
Company and appeal was made to the Supreme Court of the
United States on the ground that the state had attempted
to impair the obligation of contract, as the contract of the
older company with Harvard College lacked a number of
years of expiring. The Supreme Court .sustained the right
of the state to incorporate the second bridge company. This
was in absolute conflict with the Dartmouth College Case
and the case of Fletcher v. Peck, both decisions of Marshall.
For the third time, Justice Story dissented, and this time
he was joined by Justice Thompson.
The climax of the judicial career of Chief Justice Taney
came with the Dred Scott decision which was handed down
on March 6, 1857. This decision by the court of last resort
finally resulted in an appeal to arms which was destined
to reverse the decree of the nation's highest court of law.
The Civil War was then at hand, and it is remarkable and
interesting that during the period covered by the War no
echo of it was reflected from the Supreme Court. The only
11
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change that the War produced was in the resignation of
Justice Campbell, who left the Bench to devote his efforts to
the cause of the South.
In 1862, the Prize Cases arose, in which the Supreme
Court upheld the President's right to institute a blockade.
These decisions were of great importance to the cause of
the North. The President had appointed three new jus-
tices-Swayne, Miller, and Davis-whose selection made
these decisions possible. The attitude of the Chief Justice
was clearly indicated by his decision from the Circuit
Bench in the Merryman Case in which he denied the right
of President Lincoln to suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus.
But the career of Justice Taney was about at an end. He
was unable to serve on the Bench during 1863, and in Octo-
ber of the following year he died. On the sixth of Decem-
ber, 1864, Chase was appointed to succeed him.
The new Chief Justice held views also at wide variance
to those of his predecessor. He held pronounced views in
opposition to slavery, and in 1841 he had become one of
the leaders of the Liberty Party. The fact that many of
his acts while Secretary of the Treasury during the early
years of the War were unconstitutional, did not deter him
as Chief Justice from reverting to principles of interpreta-
tion established by Marshall.
Political influence was held responsible for the reversal
by the Court of the decision in the case of Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, one of the Legal Tender Cases. This case declared the
Legal Tender acts unconstitutional much to the chagrin of
President Grant and other prominent Republicans. The
Court at this time consisted of eight judges, the Chief Jus-
tice and seven associates. The Chief Justice (Chase) and
four associates concurred, and three dissented from the
opinion. By the provisions of an act of Congress which
took effect on the first Monday in December, 1869, it was
enacted that "the court should consist of a chief justice
and eight associates, and that, for the purpose of this act,
there should be appointed an additional judge." Justice
Grier, who had voted with the majority in this case, re-
signed February 1, 1870. President Grant, under the pro-
visions of the judiciary act of 1869, appointed to the
Supreme Bench Justices Strong and Bradley. When the
12
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case of Hepburn v. Griswold came up for rehearing, both of
these new justices voted for reversal, which gave a major-
ity of one. The Court and President Grant were severely
criticized, but in later years the new decision has been
more generally approved.
The Supreme Court remained comparatively free from
party criticism from 1870 to the time it rendered the income
tax decisions in May, 1895. This decision was arrived at
by a vote of five to four, and reversed the decision of 1880.
The later decision was severely condemned by the Demo-
cratic and Populist platforms of 1896, and finally resulted
in the sixteenth amendment. For this decision the Court
was derided as the ally of the rich, and the defender of
special privilege, and there has been an increasing tendency
since that time to criticize the Court. The decisions are so
often rendered by a divided Court, often by a five to four
vote, and the diversity of grounds on which the various
members have reached their diverging conclusions has sug-
gested that the justices are prompted by party convictions
rather than established and infallible guiding principles of
law. The climax of opposition to the courts came in 1912,
when the recall of judicial decisions became a national is-
sue. Although it must be admitted that the members of
the Court have not always been able to free themselves
from party conviction it is qually true that they have not
debased their decisions with political doctrine in giving
effect to their respective views. Carson discusses the in-
fluence of party convictions on judicial decisions as follows:
"The theories of the Constitution entertained by Mar-
shall and Taney were those of their respective parties,
and are irreconcilable. Without imputing to either a
desire to extend unnecessarily or immoderately the doc-
trines of their schools it can be safely asserted that al-
though partisan politics should have no place upon the
Bench, yet it is impossible to expect men to divest them-
selves of certain fundamental views in relation to the
nature of our Government simply because they have
ascended the Bench and thrown aside the contentions of
the political arena."
The history of these onslaughts of criticism has been that
when political ammunition has spent itself and the smoke
13
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of battle has cleared away the principles enunciated by the
Court are found anchored to fundamental principles of law.
And those who find themselves at variance with the views
of the Court for the moment can console themselves with
the thought that the Constitution of the United States, in
its principles and in its main features, is no longer the sub-
ject of controversy, of debate or of doubt. The line of
sovereignty in the states and the nature, extent, and
limits of the sovereignty of the national Government
have been distinctly marked; and thus the gravest
questions that have arisen under the Constitution-ques-
tions that disturbed the harmony and threatened the exis-
tence of the Union-have passed from the field of debate
ipto the realm of settled law.
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